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This article is in two parts.  The first provides a general
overview of the principal objectives and features of a bank
resolution regime, drawing in particular on the design of the
United Kingdom’s Special Resolution Regime (SRR). 
The second part of the article considers the measures adopted
in the design of the SRR to provide appropriate protection to
uninsured creditors and counterparties of a failed bank.  These
creditors could typically include bondholders and wholesale
depositors as well as market counterparties owed sums by the
bank under derivatives and other financial contracts.  These
protective measures — referred to as ‘creditor safeguards’ —
can be broadly divided into two categories:  ex-ante
restrictions on the ways in which resolution tools can be
deployed and ex-post rights to compensation.
This second part aims to show why these safeguards are
necessary and how their design requires a careful balance
between providing an appropriate degree of market certainty
on the one hand and retaining sufficient flexibility to effect an
orderly resolution on the other.  Finally, it offers some
examples from the resolution of the Dunfermline Building
Society to show why getting the balance of creditor safeguards
right is so important to effective resolution.
Part 1:  An overview of bank resolution
Bank failures have the potential to occur very quickly.  The
‘maturity transformation’ which banks undertake, ie funding
long-term assets such as mortgages with short-term liabilities
such as deposits payable on demand, makes them inherently
vulnerable to a rapid loss of confidence by their creditors.  A
run by depositors to withdraw their funds can swiftly put
pressure on the bank’s ability to repay these debts.  And while
a bank that is solvent and still viable may look to the central
bank to provide liquidity as lender of last resort, the herd effect
of a run can leave little time to stabilise the situation and
avoid a downward spiral into insolvency.  
Why have a bank resolution regime?
Generally when a company fails and it cannot restructure its
debts or be sold in order to continue as a going concern, its
owners or creditors will wind it up.  The company’s assets are
sold over time, with the proceeds used to satisfy, as far as
possible, its creditors’ claims in a fixed order of priority.  That is
an approach common to most countries and generally
operates successfully for firms large and small, regulated and
unregulated. 
Prior to the adoption of the SRR, insolvent banks in the 
United Kingdom were subject only to normal corporate
insolvency law.  The insolvency process allows losses to fall on
creditors who have assumed the risk of lending to the bank,
removes uncompetitive banks from the market place and
makes space for new competition.  Assuming it is successfully
combined with rapid payout of compensation by a deposit
insurance scheme, insolvency provides some protection to the
bank’s retail depositors, while ensuring that depositors with
deposits in excess of the insurance limit retain responsibility
for the investment choices they make.(2)
But the insolvency of a bank, particularly one with a large
number of depositors and financial counterparties, has the
Not for the first time, the global banking crisis illustrated the vulnerability of banks to a loss of
confidence by their depositors, other creditors and counterparties.  The experience highlighted the
need to have special arrangements for dealing with failing banks — a ‘special resolution regime’ —
that provides the authorities with the tools necessary to reduce the systemic risks arising from 
a bank’s failure while at the same time limiting the taxpayers’ exposure to the costs.  The 
United Kingdom’s own Special Resolution Regime for dealing with failing banks and building
societies was born out of the difficulties in dealing with the failure of Northern Rock in the autumn
of 2007.
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potential to generate wider costs or ‘negative externalities’ for
society extending well beyond the losses to a bank’s
immediate creditors.  Banks play an essential role in the
payments system, they provide credit for goods and services
and act as repositories for public savings and cash balances.
Banks also play an essential role in the transmission of
monetary policy.(1) But unlike other types of business, it is very
difficult for banks to operate once in insolvency.  
Commencement of insolvency leads to a freeze in the bank’s
ability to make payments, which effectively results in the end
of its business.(2) The sudden severing of these
interconnections between a bank and the rest of the financial
system and wider economy can have highly undesirable
systemic effects.  Individuals and small companies are entitled
to compensation by the Financial Services Compensation
Scheme (FSCS) for the first £85,000 of their deposits.  
But even a relatively short delay in the time needed by the
FSCS to process and pay many deposit insurance claims can
lead to hardship for households and businesses left
temporarily without access to their savings.  Disruption of this
kind can undermine depositor confidence, potentially
triggering contagion to other banks and endangering financial
stability. 
The insolvency practitioner appointed to manage the
insolvency has neither responsibility nor powers to address
these wider risks — their duty is limited to acting in the
financial interests of the creditors.  For these reasons 
corporate insolvency law can be ill-suited for resolving failed
banks.  In the absence of a bank resolution regime, the
alternative to insolvency is stark.  As the run on Northern Rock
in 2007 and its subsequent nationalisation in February 2008
graphically demonstrated, the provision of liquidity to a failing
bank may fail to stabilise the balance sheet.  In such
circumstances, and when the failure presents a systemic risk,
the authorities can be left with little option but to use public
money to support the bank and keep it open to prevent
systemic disruption. 
Bailing out a bank in this way transfers the cost and risk of a
bank failure from its creditors to taxpayers.(3) In addition to
these direct costs, the anticipation of such action can create an
ongoing risk to the system.  The lack of a credible resolution
regime encourages a ‘moral hazard’ problem.  The
management, shareholders and creditors of the largest banks
come to operate under the assumption that the bank will not
be allowed to fail and that they will not be required fully to
account for the risks that they take.  This implicit guarantee of
state support generates a subsidy for banks that are
considered too big or important to fail, allowing them to fund
themselves more cheaply than small banks.(4) In turn this can
lower incentives for market discipline and encourage the sorts
of risky behaviour that may increase the likelihood that this
public support may eventually be required.
Given these risks, the principal objective of a bank resolution
regime is to give the authority responsible for its operation
(the ‘resolution authority’) a range of options for dealing with
a failing bank beyond normal insolvency.  To be effective, these
options must be capable of preserving financial stability by
sustaining any vital economic functions performed by the bank
while ensuring that the bank’s losses are borne by its
shareholders and creditors and not by the taxpayer.(5) This is
the rationale for the ‘stabilisation’ or directed transfer powers
available to the authorities under the SRR.
Transfer powers:  splitting the balance sheet of the
bank
The legal power to transfer some or all of the business of a
failed bank to another company lies at the core of the 
United Kingdom’s SRR and of most other bank resolution
regimes around the world.(6) Transfer powers may be used to
split the balance sheet of a failed bank into at least two parts
(a ‘partial transfer’):  
￿ one part, — typically including the retail deposits(7) plus any
marketable assets and liabilities from the failed bank — is
immediately transferred to a buyer, which would likely be
another bank.  If a buyer cannot be found quickly enough,
the business is transferred to a temporary ‘bridge bank’
specially set up by the resolution authority to manage the
business until it can be sold;  and
￿ another part, comprising the remaining assets and liabilities,
is not transferred and stays on the balance sheet of the
failed bank, which typically enters a special form of
insolvency (in the UK SRR this is termed the ‘bank
administration procedure’ to distinguish it from the bespoke
whole bank liquidation process in which insured depositors
receive compensation from the FSCS, which is known as the
‘bank insolvency procedure’).  
The purpose of splitting the balance sheet in this way is to
transfer to a solvent and stable entity, creditors and financial
counterparties of the bank deemed a systemic risk and which
therefore need to be protected to maintain financial stability.
(1) See Hüpkes (2005) for a more in-depth discussion of the essential role in the
economy that banks play.
(2) See Huertas (2011).
(3) See Parker (2011) and Herring (2011) for further discussion of the risks of open bank
assistance.
(4) Research has suggested that ‘too big to fail banks’ benefit from an implicit subsidy in
their cost of funding worth between 10 and 50 basis points (see Claessens et al
(2010)).  The Bank of England has estimated that the implicit funding subsidy to 
UK banks and building societies in 2009 amounted to £100 billion (Bank of England
(2010)). 
(5) The Financial Stability Board (FSB) has recently published a consultation paper setting
out what it considers to be the key attributes that should be part of a resolution
regime for financial institutions (FSB (2011)).
(6) The transfer powers are called ‘stabilisation powers’ in the United Kingdom’s SRR and
a ‘purchase (of assets) and an assumption (of liabilities)’ in the United States.  The
United States has had a bank resolution authority since 1933 and Canada since 1967.
Transfer powers have also existed in Italy for some time and have been recently
adopted in Germany.
(7) This could potentially be limited only to the insured amount of any deposits, ie up to
the current limit of £85,000 for each eligible depositor, with the remainder of the
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In addition, good-quality assets and business lines that may
attract a going concern sale premium may be transferred.
Creditors whose claims do not satisfy these criteria are left in
the residual bank, thereby removing the need for public funds
to support them.  By providing the resolution authority with
flexibility to decide how the balance sheet should be divided,
the transfer powers thereby offer a range of alternative options
that sit between insolvency and nationalisation.
The key features of the United Kingdom’s SRR(1)
The bank resolution regime in the United Kingdom evolved in
two steps.  Initially, broad powers were set out in emergency
legislation introduced in February 2008 and conferred on the
Treasury primarily for the nationalisation of Northern Rock.(2)
The power to use this legislation for new bank failures
automatically expired after one year, and was replaced by a
permanent bank resolution framework set out in the 
Banking Act 2009.  The SRR sought to draw on best practice
internationally.  It provides roles for the Financial Services
Authority (FSA) in triggering the SRR and for the Treasury,
principally in retaining its nationalisation powers and its
control of the use of public funds in resolution.  The largest role
is reserved for the Bank of England which, as resolution
authority, can operate its transfer powers within the following
framework:
Scope of application: The SRR extends to all UK-incorporated
firms that are authorised by the FSA to accept deposits.(3)
Investment banks and other financial institutions therefore fall
outside its scope if they do not have a deposit-taking licence.
The UK branches of foreign banks also fall outside of the
resolution regime’s scope as they form parts of companies
incorporated overseas.(4)
Trigger for use: Transfer powers are most effective in
preserving franchise value and expediting orderly resolution if
they can be used before a bank enters insolvency and its
financial transactions are suspended.  But the prospect of
intervention at too early a stage in a bank’s decline can 
further destabilise it, hastening its demise and reducing the
prospects of a private sector solution to its problems.  The
United Kingdom’s SRR seeks to avoid this risk by specifying
two triggers for using the SRR tools.  First, the FSA must decide
that the bank is failing, or likely to fail, the regulatory
requirements it must meet in order to be authorised to take
deposits.  And second, the FSA must also determine that it is
not reasonably likely that action (outside the SRR) may be
taken by or in respect of the bank that would enable it once
again to meet these regulatory requirements.  These
determinations can therefore be reached by the FSA before the
bank is insolvent, but once the realistic prospect of recovery
has gone. 
Objectives for choice and use of the tools: The Banking Act
sets out five objectives that the Bank of England, as resolution
authority, must balance when determining the selection and
use of the resolution tools.  These are:
￿ to protect and enhance UK financial stability;
￿ to protect and enhance public confidence in the stability of
the UK banking system;
￿ to protect depositors;
￿ to protect public funds;  and
￿ to avoid interfering with property rights in contravention of
the United Kingdom’s Human Rights Act 1998.
The Bank of England is entitled to balance these statutory
objectives as it sees fit.  Before using a transfer power it must
first satisfy itself (following consultation with the Treasury and
FSA) that use of the power is necessary for one or more of the
first three of these objectives.  This necessity test serves the
purpose of ensuring that there is sufficient public interest to
justify interfering with the property rights of the failing bank or
its shareholders (see the box on page 216 for why this is
necessary).
The SRR also gives the Treasury power to take into temporary
public ownership a bank or the bank’s parent company (if
incorporated in the United Kingdom) through the compulsory
acquisition of shares from its shareholders.  This is a last resort
measure for use where, for example, it is considered that the
complexity, scale and urgency of the crisis would make the
Bank of England’s powers to transfer part or all of the failing
bank’s business to another buyer or bridge bank unworkable or
insufficient to protect financial stability.  The threshold for its
use is consequently higher than for the other powers;  the
Treasury must be satisfied that this action is necessary to
resolve or reduce a serious threat to financial stability or to
protect public funds that have been provided for that purpose.   
Making the transfer: The SRR is an ‘administrative’ rather
than ‘judicial’ process;  the Bank of England does not need
court approval to exercise its transfer powers and can do so
once the SRR has been triggered simply by issuing a written
transfer document (the ‘transfer instrument’).  The transfer
instrument sets out the terms of the transfer and the time at
which the transfer becomes automatically effective.
Insolvency of the ‘residual bank’: In a partial property
transfer, the part of the failed bank not transferred to a bridge
bank or commercial purchaser (called the ‘residual bank’) is
likely to be placed into an insolvency process managed by an
insolvency practitioner (the ‘bank administrator’).  This process
(called the ‘bank administration procedure’) departs from a
(1) For further discussion see Bailey (2009) and Brierley (2009).
(2) The Banking (Special Provisions) Act 2008.
(3) Credit unions are explicitly excluded on the grounds that their size makes resolution
through normal insolvency procedures sufficient.
(4) Since the introduction of the SRR, the FSB, European Commission and IMF have all put
forward proposals to extend the transfer powers available in bank resolution regimes
more broadly to other systemically important financial institutions.216 Quarterly Bulletin  2011 Q3
Bank resolution and the protection of
property rights
For a resolution to be effective, the resolution authority must
be able to transfer a failed bank’s business or, in the case of
temporary public ownership, acquire the bank’s shares without
the need to obtain the consent of the bank, its counterparties
or the relevant shareholders.  Similarly, the resolution
authority requires certain powers to modify or override
contractual terms in order to allow for the transferred business
to continue operating.  To the extent that these powers involve
the expropriation of, or interference with, property rights, they
must be consistent with Article 1 Protocol 1 of the 
European Convention of Human Rights.  Article 1 Protocol 1
(which is incorporated into domestic law by the Human Rights
Act 1998) prevents individuals and legal entities within the
European Union from being deprived of their possessions and
property rights except in the public interest.  Care was
therefore taken when developing the United Kingdom’s SRR 
to impose certain of the public interest objectives as 
pre-conditions to the use of the transfer powers and to
establish mechanisms for compensating persons for the value
of the property or property rights that were taken away or
interfered with. 
normal insolvency process in certain key respects.  Perhaps
most significantly, it makes it the priority of the bank
administrator to ensure that the residual bank provides
services (eg the continued provision of IT infrastructure, or the
servicing of mortgages) on a temporary basis to the new owner
of the transferred business to allow the owner to operate the
business effectively until successor arrangements can be
implemented.  The bank administrator is also required to
obtain the consent of the Bank of England before it takes a
number of actions in relation to the residual bank’s business. 
All these modifications are designed to facilitate the transfer 
of business.  They also reflect the fact that the purchaser may
not have had an opportunity to agree on some of the
transitional arrangements that usually accompany the sale of a
banking business and therefore is likely to need this general
assurance of support.  For similar reasons, the Bank of England
is also given powers to impose, cancel or modify certain
obligations owed between the transferred business and
companies that were formerly part of its group before it was
transferred.
Use of public funds: While the SRR is designed to minimise
the need for public funds, a resolution may still require their
use,(1) albeit in circumstances where the risk of loss to the
taxpayer is much lower than in a bailout.  The Treasury 
retains a controlling hand in the use of public funds in the
United Kingdom’s SRR and the Bank must therefore obtain the
Treasury’s consent before exercising a resolution tool that is
likely to have implications for public funds.
Since the introduction of the United Kingdom’s SRR a great
deal of further progress has been made both within Europe 
and globally to identify the key attributes of an effective
resolution regime.(2) These initiatives recognise the
importance of ensuring that broad transfer powers are
combined with adequate safeguards.  The remainder of this
article considers the different types of safeguards and the
reasons behind adopting them.   
Part 2:  Protections afforded to creditors and
counterparties in the SRR
Compensation safeguards:  the ‘No Creditor Worse
Off’ principle
Depositors and other creditors whose claims are transferred
out of a failed bank in a resolution clearly benefit from the 
use of the transfer powers.  They are able to continue as
depositors of a new bank with all of their transferred funds
intact and with little, if any, disruption in their access to
banking services.  Counterparties of the bank whose contracts
are transferred to the buyer are similarly able to carry on as
before rather than deal with the consequences of the bank’s
insolvency.
Creditors, such as bondholders or other wholesale funders,
that the resolution authority may have decided to leave
behind in the residual bank do not enjoy these benefits.  They
must claim instead for repayment of their debts in the bank’s
insolvency.  But as is shown in the box on page 217, a decision
to split the balance sheet in a way that fully protects
depositors and certain other creditors could, on the face of it,
put those creditors left behind in a potentially worse position
than had the transfer powers never been used and the bank
had been left to go through normal insolvency.
One reason for this lies in the fact that, under UK insolvency
law, depositors in the United Kingdom rank equally — or 
‘pari passu’ — with other ordinary senior creditors and
therefore should share any losses equally between them.(3)
(1) For example, the Treasury may be required to provide funds upfront to facilitate a
transfer of liabilities (as in the case of the Dunfermline Building Society resolution)
and will later seek to recover some or all of these costs from the FSCS as described in
Part 2 of this article.
(2) For example, the European Commission’s consultation on technical details of a
possible European crisis management framework, 6 January 2011;  the FSB
Consultative Document on effective resolution of systemically important financial
institutions, 19 July 2011.
(3) This contrasts with some other jurisdictions, most notably the United States, where
depositors rank ahead of the other creditors (so-called ‘depositor preference’).Research and analysis Bank resolution:  safeguarding the creditors left behind 217
But the decision to transfer retail depositors along with 
higher-quality assets of an equivalent, or nearly equivalent,(1)
amount to another bank can result in the creditors left in the
insolvency (with the remaining lower-quality assets)
effectively subsidising the depositors that have been
transferred.  Any shortfall between the assets and liabilities of
the bank, which would have been shared equally among
depositors and the other unsecured ordinary creditors in
insolvency, falls to be borne exclusively by the creditors left
behind.  And while the immediate sale of the banking business
as a ‘going concern’ is more likely to retain its value and
achieve a greater price than a sale out of insolvency, this may
be insufficient to make up the difference (see the example
above). 
The unsecured creditors left behind in the residual bank would
therefore have to bear the extra costs of saving a bank’s retail
depositors, effectively disrupting the normal ranking of these
creditors.  Quite how much extra these creditors could lose
would depend upon the split determined during the resolution.
Without this information, creditors would have no means of
assessing in advance their likely ‘loss given default’ in a
resolution.  And exposing these creditors to additional losses
beyond what they could expect to incur in an ordinary
insolvency would go further than necessary to address the
(1) The purchaser may pay a premium for acquiring the new customers and the franchise
of the deposit business.  This premium for the deposits amounts to the difference
between the deposit liabilities and the assets transferred with them. 
The potential effect of transfer powers on creditors left 
in the insolvent bank
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This example shows how a partial property transfer could
prejudice creditors whose claims are left behind in the residual
bank, especially in a country (such as the United Kingdom)
where retail deposits rank equally with wholesale deposits and
other ordinary creditors in insolvency.  Panel A shows a
simplified balance sheet of a bank which is insolvent as a result
of a £30 write-down of its bad assets.  Panel B shows the
estimated recoveries creditors might receive in a normal
insolvency, while panel C shows recoveries if a partial transfer
was carried out instead.  In panel C, all retail deposits (not just
those amounts insured by the FSCS) are transferred to a
commercial purchaser, along with higher-quality assets.  
C.i assumes that the purchaser accepts £2 more of liabilities
than assets in the partial transfer, with the difference
effectively constituting a purchase price for acquiring the failed
bank’s deposit franchise.  Equity, subordinated debt and
wholesale deposits, together with lower-quality assets, are left
behind in the residual bank, which goes into the bank
administration procedure (C.ii).  If the bank’s £100 book value
of assets were worth only £70 in insolvency, the percentages in
grey represent the net recoveries as a proportion of the original
claims for each type of creditor.  Wholesale creditors incur an
extra loss of £7 directly as a result of the transfer as compared
to a normal insolvency.  This is because in insolvency of the
whole firm they would have had an equal claim over the £70
remaining value of the assets with the transferred depositors
and would have received £39 (78% of £50) instead of £32
(64% of £50) in the bank administration procedure.  The FSCS
can be required to contribute towards reducing this shortfall
by providing an amount up to the net loss the FSCS would
have incurred if it had paid out insured depositors and sought
to recover their claims in the insolvency of the whole bank.
Any remaining shortfall (for example, arising from the decision
to transfer significantly more liabilities than just insured
deposit balances) may entitle the wholesale creditors to
compensation by the Treasury under the creditor safeguards.
Treasury consent to such a transfer is required if it is likely to
lead to compensation.218 Quarterly Bulletin  2011 Q3
problems of moral hazard.  These are all outcomes that the
SRR has sought to avoid by the introduction of the so-called
‘No Creditor Worse Off’ (NCWO) safeguard.  
The NCWO safeguard applies to bank resolutions that involve
a partial transfer.  It entitles creditors to compensation from
the state if it is determined that the amount they end up
recovering in the residual bank’s insolvency is less than what it
is estimated they would have recovered if the whole bank had
simply been placed into insolvency.  An independent valuer is
appointed to make this assessment and the compensation is
effectively the shortfall between the actual amount they have
recovered and the estimated recovery had no split occurred.
By placing a floor on their losses based on this counterfactual,
the safeguard permits creditors of a bank to assume that the
losses they could be exposed to will be either the same or
better than in insolvency. 
One consequence of a transfer of insured depositors in a
resolution is to remove the need for the FSCS to pay them
compensation;  the insured depositors simply become the
depositors of the bank that has acquired the deposit business
so the need for compensation does not arise.  But as is shown
in the diagram in the box on page 217, a transfer of all
depositors along with matching assets can also create a
greater loss for those creditors left behind.  If so,
compensation from the state may become payable and the
effectiveness of a resolution regime in reducing the risk to
public funds is diminished. 
To avoid a situation where the Treasury is required to pay
public funds as compensation while the industry-funded FSCS
effectively avoids having to pay compensation, the Treasury is
entitled to ask the FSCS to contribute to the cost of the
resolution.  In a normal payout the FSCS would be required to
pay compensation upfront to the insured depositors and then
seek to recover as much as possible of this amount by taking
their place as a creditor in the bank’s insolvency.  In order to
replicate this, the FSCS can be asked to contribute an amount
equal to the estimated loss the FSCS would have incurred had
the transfer never taken place and it had instead been required
to pay out compensation in insolvency and assume their
claims in the insolvency. 
Calculating how much of its payout the FSCS would have
failed to recover is again the job of the independent valuer.
Once calculated, the FSCS can be required by the Treasury to
contribute up to this amount to meet the costs of the
resolution.  The FSCS contribution could be provided ex ante,
eg to inject cash into the transfer, or ex post, eg to reimburse
the Treasury or the Bank of England for any costs incurred in
the course of the resolution, eg a cash payment to support the
transfer of assets and liabilities to another person.
In this way, the FSCS continues to cover the costs of protecting
insured depositors whether in a payout in insolvency or in a
non-payout resolution using the transfer powers.  Only where
it is deemed necessary for financial stability reasons to protect
liabilities other than insured deposits, does it become more
likely that funds or compensation paid by the Treasury may not
be fully recouped. 
Safeguards that restrict the use of resolution powers
The NCWO safeguard provides the first level of protection to
assure creditors that their ranking will be respected and allows
the resolution authority to act more swiftly and decisively in
the knowledge that actions that might otherwise upset the
ranking of creditors in insolvency can be offset by
compensation.
By contrast, the second type of safeguard acts to constrain the
resolution authority’s discretion in the use of its powers.  As
has already been described, the SRR provides the resolution
authority with broad powers to transfer property and
contracts in a way that best meets its resolution objectives.
These powers could potentially be used in a manner that splits
up the contractual rights and obligations that collectively
make up a financial arrangement in a way that undermines its
economic purpose.
Preserving these arrangements sets up a tension between
providing certainty to market counterparties that their
contractual arrangements will be respected in a resolution,
and giving the resolution authority sufficient flexibility to split
the balance sheet.  Balancing these competing interests is
crucial as significant uncertainty could negatively impact upon
the price of debt or other financial contracts issued by banks in
the United Kingdom, potentially generating an ongoing
deadweight loss for the economy.  For this reason the
safeguards were the subject of close scrutiny and comment by
financial market participants throughout the development of
the SRR.(1)
The result was the introduction of rules that prevent the
resolution authority from using its transfer powers to split up
certain defined types of financial arrangement (see the box on
page 219).  These types of protected arrangement are broadly
speaking arrangements whose purpose is to reduce the
counterparty’s loss in the event of the failure of the bank.
Netting and set-off arrangements that allow each party to
reduce the amounts they owe to each other into one net sum
are therefore covered.  So too are arrangements that use
collateral assets to protect against the risk of non-payment.  
If these arrangements cannot be relied upon, the counterparty
has no way of measuring what loss it may suffer in a
resolution.  Retaining the effect of these arrangements
therefore plays a similar role to respecting the ranking of
creditors.
(1) The Treasury consulted a panel of experts to provide it with advice during the
development and drafting of the safeguards.  The Banking Act established a
permanent statutory panel of experts (the Banking Liaison Panel) that meets quarterly
to advise on the safeguards and other aspects of the SRR.   Research and analysis Bank resolution:  safeguarding the creditors left behind 219
The need for certainty lies at the heart of these safeguards.  
By setting them out in legislation,(1)financial participants are
able to continue to rely on these risk mitigation techniques
and assume that they will provide the same protection in a
resolution as in insolvency.  Similarly, regulators and credit
rating agencies are able to accept the legal enforceability of
netting and other protected arrangements when determining
whether they satisfy various regulatory requirements.(2)
The legislation also sets out the remedial steps which must be
taken if the resolution inadvertently breaches the safeguards,
perhaps as a result of incomplete information at the time of
the resolution.  If a transfer incorrectly separates rights and
obligations under a netting or set-off arrangement, the
legislation permits the counterparty to continue to exercise its
rights to set-off or net an amount it owes against the failed
bank to reduce its exposure to the continuing business.
Whereas if other types of arrangement are disrupted, the
resolution authority must instead restore the protected
arrangement by carrying out a further transfer of rights and
liabilities in order to cure the breach.
Why the safeguards must have exceptions
The resolution authority will generally want to retain as much
discretion as possible to disentangle the liabilities that need to
be supported in the resolution (particularly the insured retail
deposits) from those that can be left in insolvency.  In addition,
commercial purchasers may be interested only in purchasing
some assets and liabilities of the business of the failed bank
and not others.  The safeguards, by requiring certain assets and
liabilities to be kept together, operate instead to limit the
resolution authority’s freedom to determine this split.
Ensuring that a transfer does not breach the safeguards also
significantly increases the need for detailed and up-to-date
information about a firm’s protected arrangements.  This in
turn increases the amount of time required for planning by the
resolution authority in advance of the resolution.  How much
Creditor safeguards that restrict the use of
transfer powers
￿ Netting, set-off and title transfer arrangements 
(eg repos): Netting and set-off arrangements are used by
banks and their counterparties to mitigate credit risk.  These
arrangements operate to allow each party to calculate and
set-off amounts owed by and to each other under one or
more contracts to produce a single net sum.  Title transfer
arrangements similarly work to reduce credit risk by linking
an obligation to repay one or more debts with the obligation
of the lender to redeliver collateral.  To work as intended the
relevant rights and obligations must remain owing to and
from the parties to the arrangement at the point at which
the netting, set-off or redelivery takes place.  The UK
legislation therefore operates to prevent the transfer
instrument from being used to split up rights and liabilities
under such arrangements save in the case of certain
‘excluded rights and liabilities’ (eg retail deposits and loans).
￿ Secured liabilities: Where a debt is secured against
collateral assets (eg a mortgage), the UK legislation prevents
the transfer powers from transferring this collateral
separately from the debt that the collateral secures.
￿ Capital market arrangements: Securitisation programmes,
covered bonds and other structured finance arrangements
can comprise many separate contracts, each of which is
necessary for the arrangement to operate as a whole and
many of which serve a purpose only in relation to that wider
arrangement.(1) As a result, the legislation seeks to define
these types of capital market arrangement and to require
that they be kept whole in a resolution.  To allow some of
these contracts to be left in the insolvency (where they
could be terminated) while moving others to a new entity
would risk the arrangement breaking down. 
￿ Financial market arrangements: Certain rules and
arrangements within investment exchanges and clearing
houses are designed to minimise the effect of the default by
a participant.  These arrangements are protected by
legislation in the United Kingdom that is designed to ensure
the financial stability and the smooth running of the system.
The United Kingdom’s SRR avoids upsetting these statutory
protections by preventing the transfer instrument from
modifying them or rendering them unenforceable.
￿ Termination rights: The transfer powers give the resolution
authority the power to prevent counterparties from relying
on the resolution as grounds for terminating a contract.  This
power to override termination rights cannot however be
used to prevent a counterparty triggering netting or set-off
arrangements where the arrangements relate to a wide
range of financial contracts.
(1) A mortgage securitisation programme, which pools mortgage loans as security for
bonds issued to investors, will have many contractual arrangements, for example,
between the bank which sells the mortgages, an issuer which purchases and structures
the portfolio of mortgages and issues the bonds, a trustee which represents the
interests of investors which purchase the bonds, a servicer which performs the usual
functions of collecting mortgage receipts, a cash manager, swap counterparties etc.  
(1) They are contained in the (amended) Banking Act 2009 (Restriction of Partial
Transfers) Order 2009 (SI 2009/322).
(2) If Bank X lent Bank Y £50 million and Bank Y deposited £20 million with Bank X, and
these contracts are covered by a netting arrangement, the regulator would only
require Bank X to hold regulatory capital to support the net exposure of £30 million
rather than £50 million on a gross basis.220 Quarterly Bulletin  2011 Q3
time is needed for this due diligence will be a function of the
number of such contracts, which may increase exponentially
with the size and complexity of the firm.  And this due
diligence exercise is further complicated by the need to
conduct it in a way that reduces the risks that news of the
contingency planning is leaked, potentially further
destabilising the bank.
There is a risk that in complying with these creditor safeguards,
the operational challenges become so onerous that the
resolution authority is incapable of undertaking a resolution of
anything other than a small and simple bank.  That would
undermine the effectiveness of a bank resolution regime and
tip the balance too far in favour of market certainty and away
from the public interest in protecting financial stability and
curbing moral hazard. 
To avoid this outcome, the SRR contains a number of
exceptions from the requirement that protected arrangements
should always remain undisturbed.  The most important
category of exception applies to FSCS-insured deposit
accounts or accounts which are mainly used or marketed to
these insured depositors.(1) The Bank of England is able to
transfer these without the need to confirm whether or not
they form part of a protected arrangement (eg an offset
mortgage linking a retail deposit with a mortgage).  This is
necessary to ensure that a retail deposit book can be
transferred to prospective purchasers within the time needed
for effective and expeditious resolution.
Practical experience of using the tools and applying
the safeguards
The resolution of Dunfermline Building Society (DBS) in 
March 2009 was the first, and so far the only time, that the
transfer powers have been used by the Bank of England under
the United Kingdom’s SRR;  previous bank resolutions were
carried out under the earlier, temporary legislation (see 
Table Afor details of all uses of property transfer powers in the
United Kingdom).  The resolution of DBS provides an
illustration of the practical challenges faced by a resolution
authority in seeking to comply with the creditor safeguards.  It
also shows the effect these safeguards can have in shaping the
assets and liabilities transferred in the resolution. 
While the resolution of DBS was not the biggest of the
resolutions undertaken in the United Kingdom (Table A), it was
the most complex in terms of splitting assets and liabilities
between three different legal entities — the original building
society which went into administration, the purchaser
(Nationwide) and the bridge bank.  It was the only partial
transfer to date in the United Kingdom where financial assets
(the own-originated mortgage portfolio) from the failed firm
were transferred along with the retail deposits(2) and wholesale
depositors (eg larger companies).(3)
The treatment in the resolution of derivatives contracts
covered by netting arrangements offers a good example of the
challenges faced by a resolution authority.  As typical for even
a small and relatively simple banking operation, DBS had
entered into a number of swap contracts to hedge different
parts of its business, which were subject to a netting
agreement.  The netting safeguards required the Bank of
England to keep all the swap contracts under each netting
agreement together even though the underlying assets and
liabilities that they hedged were split between Nationwide and
the residual bank.  In addition, some of the netting agreements
included general ‘sweep up’ clauses that unexpectedly
captured rights and liabilities that neither party expected to be
included when calculating their net exposures.(4)
As a result of these complications a mismatch arose between
the location of swaps and the exposures they hedged.  That
resulted in some parts of the business being unhedged until it
could be determined which swap contracts covered which
exposures.  This took time to resolve by identifying which
swaps to close out (at cost) and which to leave open, resulting
in a delay before the Bank of England was able to inform swap
counterparties how they were treated in the resolution.(5)
Finally, DBS highlighted the difficulties faced by the resolution
authority in splitting a balance sheet with precision, especially
when the accuracy of the information provided by the failed
bank cannot be assured.  Following the resolution of DBS, it
was possible to undertake a further more detailed audit which
identified that the definition of ‘commercial loans’ used in the
transfer documentation had unintentionally transferred a
number of additional commercial loans to Nationwide.  These
loans had not formed part of the agreed transaction and had
been managed by the bank administrator in the period
following the resolution on the assumption that they had not
been transferred to Nationwide. 
The issue was resolved by the Treasury using its powers under
the Banking Act(6) to amend the definition of ‘commercial loan’
in the transfer document with retrospective effect to align the
legal effect of the transfer with the transaction that had been
agreed.  While such retrospective powers are to be exercised
(1) Loans to retail depositors are similarly carved out of the exceptions to allow for
residential mortgages and other loans to depositors to be transferred alongside retail
deposits.
(2) In one other case, Bradford & Bingley, fixed assets in the form of the branch network
were transferred.  
(3) The ranking of retail depositors of building societies differs from that of banks in
insolvency;  the retail depositors are treated as shareholder members and rank below
other depositors in priority.  The wholesale deposits would have recovered in full in
the insolvency and therefore transferring them did not risk increasing resolution costs.
(4) These included bonds issued by some swap counterparts that were held as investment
assets by DBS.  Following the resolution of DBS, it was decided to change the
statutory safeguards to exclude transferable securities such as bonds and other listed
securities from netting protection unless the parties explicitly indicate in the netting
agreement that they should be included.
(5) This type of mismatch will typically arise except in simple cases, such as when only
deposits and cash are transferred.  It should also be noted that the safeguard does not
require all swap counterparties to be treated alike.  Some can be left in insolvency and
others transferred to the purchaser.
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only where there are serious difficulties in using other means
to address such errors, they remain a necessary tool to address
information limitations that are symptomatic of bank failures.  
Conclusion
Bank special resolution regimes are designed to address
systemic risks caused by bank failure while freeing the public
authorities from the dilemma of having to use public funds to
bail out all of a bank’s creditors.  By doing so, they offer
benefits to a financial system not only at the point of use but
more generally through their effect on the behaviour of banks
and their creditors. 
But using transfer powers in a resolution to split a balance
sheet can potentially have significant adverse implications 
for creditors left behind in insolvency as well as for
counterparties of a bank if their financial arrangements are
unpicked.  These implications can generate uncertainty for
creditors, regulators and rating agencies with knock-on effects
on the cost of bank debt, risking an ongoing deadweight loss
for the economy.  
The approach adopted in the United Kingdom’s SRR to address
these risks has been to develop limited but legally binding
constraints on the resolution authority’s powers together with
formal mechanisms for compensating creditors.  These
safeguards provide counterparties with an appropriate level of
certainty as to their treatment in a resolution and allow
creditors not transferred to another solvent bank to estimate
their loss given default along the same lines as in normal
insolvency.  The UK experience in developing a comprehensive
set of safeguards has been reflected in recent proposals by the
European Commission and the FSB for the safeguards which
could apply under their proposals for resolution regimes for
the EU and for systemically important financial institutions,
respectively.
Splitting a complex balance sheet can be challenging,
particularly if there is only limited time for due diligence.
These challenges increase with the size, complexity and
international nature of the bank’s operations.  The DBS
resolution involved a relatively small and simple bank, yet
raised a number of complications.  The complications 
highlight the fact that care must be taken when developing
Table A Details of resolutions in the United Kingdom which have used partial transfer powers
Time and date of resolution(a) Failed institution Which  Details of assets and liabilities transferred  Other information
statute(b) in the transfer instrument(c)
7.40 am on Monday 29 Sept. 2008 Bradford & Bingley plc  B(SP)A  All c.3.6 million retail deposit accounts and  Shares in the bank were transferred to 
the branch network were transferred to  HMT and, once nationalised, the deposits 
Abbey National plc (part of the Santander group).   and network of the bank were transferred 
The FSCS provided c.£15.7 billion of funds to  to Abbey.  The mortgage book remains in 
back the deposits and HM Treasury (HMT)  the nationalised company to allow for a 
provided c.£2.7 billion (total c.£18.4 billion). managed rundown.  As of 1 January 2010, 
total assets of the nationalised company 
were £49.4 billion, of which £39 billion 
were mortgages.
9.27 am on Tuesday 7 Oct. 2008 Heritable Bank plc which  B(SP)A 22,344 retail deposit accounts with balances of  The firm and the remainder of its balance 
was a UK subsidiary of  c.£547 million backed by funds of c.£457 million  sheet including loan assets with a book 
Landsbanki Islands hf Iceland from FSCS and c.£90 million from HMT were  value of c.£1.1 billion went into 
transferred to ING Direct Bank. administration.  About 340 FSCS-eligible 
deposit accounts (value c.£8 million) were 
not transferred and were paid in full by the
FSCS and HMT.
12.05 pm on Wednesday 8 Oct. 2008 Kaupthing Singer & Friedlander  B(SP)A  c.157,000 online (marketed as ‘Edge’) accounts  The firm and the remainder of its balance 
Limited which was a UK subsidiary  with balances of c.£2.7 billion were transferred to  sheet including loan assets with a book 
of Kaupthing Bank hf Iceland ING Direct Bank backed by c.£2.5 billion of funds  value of c.£3 billion were placed into 
from the FSCS and c.£0.2 billion from HMT. administration.  c.7,000 FSCS-eligible 
deposit accounts (value c.£360 million) 
not transferred were paid in full by the 
FSCS and HMT.
8.00 am on Monday 30 March 2009 Dunfermline Building Society Banking Act  Retail deposits (c.£2.3 billion), wholesale deposits  The remainder of the liabilities, including 
(c.£0.8 billion), fixed assets including 34 branches,  subordinated debt (c.£50 million), and 
liquid assets (c.£0.6 billion) and the  assets (total book value c.£1.1 billion) 
own-originated residential mortgage portfolio  primarily the commercial loans and the 
(book value c.£1 billion) were transferred to  acquired mortgage portfolios went into a 
Nationwide Building Society.  HMT injected cash  building society administration procedure. 
of £1,555 million to back the retail deposits 
transferred.  
A second partial transfer was undertaken to 
transfer social housing mortgages (c.£0.5 billion 
book value) and associated deposits (c.£5 million) 
into a bridge bank owned by the Bank of England.  
This allowed more time for a competitive tender 
of this specialised portfolio, which was subsequently 
sold to Nationwide on 1 July 2009. 
(a) The time and date the transfer was made.
(b) Banking (Special Provisions) Act 2008 (B(SP)A) or Banking Act 2009.
(c) In all partial transfers to date, total retail deposit balances including amounts above the amount insured by the FSCS have been transferred.  The resolutions were undertaken when banks and FSCS did not have the information
required — most importantly a ‘single customer view’ — to make an insurance determination quickly enough to effect a transfer of insured deposits only.  They also took place during a systemic crisis when concerns about
depositor contagion were acute.  222 Quarterly Bulletin  2011 Q3
safeguards to ensure that the resolution authority’s ability to
carry out a successful resolution is not undermined by the
practical challenges of compliance.  To the extent that
measures can be taken in the future to reduce these practical
challenges, so it will become easier to accommodate statutory
safeguards without compromising the effectiveness of bank
resolution tools (see the box above). 
Measures which could ease the practical
pressures of complying with safeguards
￿ Ensure that banks continue to develop their capability to
provide more detailed and accurate data on a real-time
basis.  This is a key focus of the Resolution and Recovery
Plans which the FSA and the Bank of England have been
developing with banks.  The FSA has also introduced new
systems and information requirements for deposit-takers,
which require the majority (those with more than 5,000
insured accounts) to be able to provide a single figure
representing the aggregate amount of an eligible claimant’s
deposit accounts held with a deposit-taker.  This single
customer view (SCV) information will be in an electronic
format readily transferable to and compatible with FSCS’s
systems. 
￿ Develop similar information requirements with respect to
derivatives portfolios.  The Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation introduced a rule in 2009 to require 
US deposit-takers to provide detailed and up-to-date
information in electronic format on their derivatives
positions within a set period after being pre-notified.(1) The
FSA has published a Consultation Paper proposing new
information requirements for derivatives and securities
transactions.(2)
￿ Augment the existing SRR by developing ways to restructure
a firm’s balance sheet without splitting it into separate parts.
There is currently much discussion around the possible use
of a ‘bail-in’ tool to write down or convert into equity some
classes of unsecured debt of a firm in resolution.  This would
enable the resolution authority to allow losses to fall on
some creditors by reducing the value of their claims on the
firm without having to deal with the operational and legal
consequences of transferring some of the business to a
purchaser.  The practical benefits of such an approach may
be significant particularly when dealing with large and
complex banks with huge numbers of counterparties and
contracts governed by different laws.(3)
(1) See www.federalregister.gov/articles/2008/12/22/E8-30221/recordkeeping-
requirements-for-qualified-financial-contracts#h-5.
(2) See Financial Services Authority, CP11/16:  Recovery and Resolution Plans.
(3) The FSB’s Consultative Document on effective resolution of systemically important
financial institutions sets out its proposed essential elements of a bail-in regime.Research and analysis Bank resolution:  safeguarding the creditors left behind 223
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